2. Tails
3. wiki/src/support/faq.*.po
4. Spanish
5. Zen

2
	English type: Plain text - For hardware compatibility issues, refer to our [[known issues|support/known_issues]].
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/880 · 88 Needs editing
3
	English type: Plain text - To learn what you can do with Tails, refer to our [[documentation|doc]].
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/740 · 74 Needs editing
4
	English type: Plain text - For questions related to Tor, see also to the [Tor support pages](https://support.torproject.org/).
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/1010 · 101 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text <h2 id="dedicated-stick">Do I need a USB stick dedicated to Tails?</h2>
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — <h2 id="onion-service">¿Puedo tener un servicio onion de Tor en Tails?</h2> 76/720 · 72 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text Yes. Tails requires a USB stick dedicated to only running Tails.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/640 · 64 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text If it were possible to use the same USB stick with another operating system, for example to store files to use on Windows, a virus in the other operating system could corrupt your Tails.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/1860 · 186 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text That's why your Tails USB stick is not recognized in Windows and why we discourage installing other live operating systems on the same USB stick.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/1450 · 145 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text To store files in your Tails USB stick, use the [[Persistent Storage|doc/persistent_storage]]. To exchange files between Tails and another operating system, use a separate USB stick.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/1820 · 182 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text <h2 id="unetbootin">Can I install Tails with UNetbootin, YUMI, Rufus, Ventoy, or another tool?</h2>
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — <h2 id="unetbootin">¿Puedo instalar Tails con UNetbootin, YUMI, Rufus o mi otra herramienta favorita?</h2> 107/1000 · 100 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text No. Upgrading whenever you get a notification from *[[Tails Upgrader|doc/upgrade]]* is enough.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/940 · 94 Needs editing
44
	Source change No. Tails provides upgrades every six4 weeks, thatwhich are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken. Updating add-ons in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> might break the security built in Tails. English type: Plain text Tails provides upgrades every 4 weeks, which are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — No. Tails provee actualizaciones cada seis semanas, que están cuidadosamente testadas para asegurarnos de que no se rompe ninguna funcionalidad o configuración de seguridad. Actualizar las extensiones del <span class="application">Navegador Tor</span> podría romper la seguridad configurada en Tails. 301/1340 · 134 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text If you upgrade the system yourself using `apt` or *Synaptic*, you might break things.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/850 · 85 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text Our team sometimes publishes emergency releases, whenever important security upgrades are available in Debian or *Tor Browser* before the next scheduled release.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/1610 · 161 Needs editing
53
	English type: Plain text It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — No es posible verificar la integridad de un dispositivo Tails, ya sea una memoria USB o un DVD, cuando se arranca Tails desde este mismo dispositivo, ya que esto sería como preguntarle a una persona si es mentirosa: la respuesta de una persona mentirosa sería siempre "no". 273/2080 · 208 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text If you worry that your Tails might be corrupted, do a [[manual upgrade|upgrade]] from a trusted operating system to upgrade it to a trusted version of Tails.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/1570 · 157 Needs editing
56
	English type: Plain text <p>In the future, we might make it possible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick from another trusted OS. ([[!tails_ticket 7496]])</p>
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/1430 · 143 Needs editing
62
	English type: Plain text Tor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your *Tor Browser* differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — Tor Browser incluye también un [[nivel de seguridad|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] y la extensión [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] para desactivar opcionalmente más JavaScript. Esto puede mejorar la seguridad en algunos casos. Sin embargo la [[huella digital|doc/about/fingerprint]] de tu navegador cambiará respecto de los otros usuarios de Tor si desactivas JavaScript. Esto puede romper tu anonimato. 448/4370 · 437 Needs editing
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	English type: Plain text <p>We have plans to allow storing the security level in the Persistent Storage. ([[!tails_ticket 9700]])</p>
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — 0/1090 · 109 Needs editing
77
	Source change InstallUpdating add-ons in <span class="application">*Tor Browser</span>* might break the security built in Tails. English type: Plain text Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — Instalar extensiones en el <span class="application">Navegador Tor</span> puede romper las configuraciones de seguridad de Tails. 130/740 · 74 Needs editing
80
	English type: Plain text As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).
	Spanish ↹ ↵ NBS … « » “ ” SHY ‐ – — Como se explica en nuestra documentación sobre [[huellas digitales|doc/about/fingerprint]], Tails provee de anonimato en la red dificultando el distinguir un usuario particular entre todos los usuarios de <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (ya sea en Tails o en otros sistemas operativos). 300/3340 · 334 Needs editing