Installing add-ons in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> might break the security built in Tails.
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<div class="next"> <ul> <li>[[Warnings about persistence|doc/first_steps/persistence/warnings#index3h1]]</li> <li>[[Browsing the web with Iceweasel|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li> <li>[[Can I hide the fact that I am using Tails?|doc/about/fingerprint/Browsing the web with <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li> </ul> </div>
<div class="next"> <ul> <li>[[Browsing the web with <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li> </ul> </div>
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Can I install other add-ons in the browser?<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>?</h2>
<h2 id="anonymity-test">How to analyse the results of online anonymity tests?</h2>
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As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprinting|doc/about/ of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity on the webby making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users ofTails and the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).
As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tailsor on other operating systems).
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So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all Tor users.users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>.
So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>.
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For example, the user-agent property of the browser was set to `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.3`, as of Tails 0.21 and TBB 2.3.25-13. This value preserves your anonymity even if the operating system installed on the computer is Windows NT and you usually run Firefoxstring of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> includes <em>Windows NT</em> but this value preserves your anonymity even if you run Windows NT. On the other hand, changing this value makes you distinguishable from others Tor users and br users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> and, as a consequence, weakens your anonymity.
For example, the user-agent string of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> includes <em>Windows NT</em> but this value preserves your anonymity even if you run Windows NT. On the other hand, changing this value makes you distinguishable from other users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>and, as a consequence, weakens your anonymity.
<h2 id="htp">Why does Tails automatically connect to websites when starting?</h2>
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This second synchronization is made by sending HTTPS queries through Tor to severals websites and deducing a correct time from their answers. TheYou can see the list of websites that could be queried in this process can be found in `Tails can connect to in *[[!tails_gitweb config/chroot_local-includes/etc/default/htpdate.pools desc="/etc/default/htpdate`.pools"]]*.
This second synchronization is made by sending HTTPS queries through Tor to several websites and deducing a correct time from their answers. You can see the list of websites that Tails can connect to in *[[!tails_gitweb config/chroot_local-includes/etc/default/htpdate.pools desc="/etc/default/htpdate.pools"]]*.